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INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  DEBATE  ABOUT:
THE  NOMINALIZATION  OF  THE  MONETARY  POLICY
FRANCISCO ROSENDE*
In July 2001, the Central Bank of Chile decided to change the way that it
performs monetary policy, leaving behind the scheme of defining a real interest
rate level and welcoming one in which the bank signals via a nominal rate.  This
change in the monetary policy procedure meant the abandonment of a practice
held by the issuing bank for over a decade.
The supporters of the scheme used before the so called “nominalization”
of the monetary policy argue that the previous system gave out clear signals
regarding the Central Bank’s intentions.  Accordingly, a higher real interest rate
was a most certain sign of a more restrictive monetary policy and vice-versa.  This
“fluent communication” between the Central Bank and the rest of the economy
could get confusing, they say, if the real interest rate started to waver as a
consequence of specifying a nominal interest rate.
The critics of the former procedure state that specifying the real interest
rate as the main tool of monetary policy contributes to the maintenance of a wide
use of indexation mechanisms.  These could eventually affect the Central Bank’s
inflation targets, in case of aggregate demand or supply shocks.  The presence of
frequent fluctuations in the monthly inflation rate, would then imply alterations in
the short term interests rates.
An essential matter in the debate about the costs and benefits of each of
these policy strategies regards the effects they have on the variability of other
macroeconomic indicators.  When the real interest rate is defined, one might expect
a greater short term instability in the nominal rates and in the money supply.  On
the other hand, fixing the nominal rates would imply a bigger variation in the short
term real interest rates.  The danger could be that the monetary authority didn’t
adjust the policy promptly enough, when perceiving a change in expected inflation.
In this case, the economy would be exposed to longer inflation –and possibly also
business– cycles.
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The following papers reflect the opinion of two distinguished Chilean
specialists in monetary policy matters.  First, Felipe Morandé explains the reasons
why the Central Bank of Chile decided to change the way  it conducts monetary
policy.  The author was at that time Director of Research of the issuing institution,
having therefore a leading role in this decision.
The second paper, written by Juan Andrés Fontaine, shows a critical position
towards the “nominalization” of the monetary policy.  Fontaine was the Central
Bank’s Director of Research between 1985 and 1990.
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